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THE SUFFOLK SYNDROME: A CASE




On August 1, 1986, lightning struck and damaged a tank of
hydrochloric acid at the Suffolk Chemical Company plant in
Chapin, South Carolina, spilling several thousand gallons of acid
and releasing a vapor cloud. The spill forced evacuation of the
nearby community. Remarkably, the incident occurred on the
fifth day of hearings before the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) to determine
whether the plant should be closed as a public nuisance. It
brought the hearings to an abrupt halt.
The hearings ultimately resumed, but the parties settled the
case without the need for a legal decision. Suffolk agreed, with-
out admitting liability or the State's authority, to close the plant
permanently. Although the issues presented were never resolved,
the case challenged the State's ability to protect its citizens and
environment and pushed Suffolk and DHEC toward a legal test
of regulatory power ultimately depending on the remedy sought:
the permanent closure of an industrial plant.
This article examines why the State based its case for clo-
sure on a public nuisance theory when DHEC had clear author-
ity and extensive enforcement powers under a number of state
and federal environmental statutes and regulations. Although
DHEC cited numerous environmental statutes during its case,
the thrust of the State's enforcement effort was the abatement
* Associate, Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A., 1976, University
of Virginia; J.D., 1981, University of South Carolina School of Law. Mr. Harleston is a
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of a public nuisance. The thesis of this article is that nuisance
law survives today amid apparently comprehensive federal and
state environmental regulations because of its nearly infinite
flexibility and adaptability and its inherent capacity to fill gaps
in statutory controls. Nuisance law retains a singular capacity to
strengthen and be strengthened by the continued development
of environmental regulations.
This article examines the relationship between nuisance law
and environmental law in the context of one case study. It is not
intended to be an in-depth study or comprehensive survey of ei-
ther area of law.
H1. NUISANCE LAW
Scholars have called nuisance law the "common law back-
bone of modern environmental and energy law."1 A nuisance is
an unreasonable interference with an individual's interests in
the use and enjoyment of land or an unreasonable interference
with rights common to the general public.2 The former is a pri-
vate nuisance; the latter is a public nuisance and is the primary
subject of this article. For a private nuisance action to lie, the
interference must be either "intentional and unreasonable, or
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules control-
ling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities."' 3 An interference is unreason-
able when: (1) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of
the actor's conduct, or (2) the harm caused by the conduct is
serious, and the financial burden of compensating injured per-
sons would not make continuation of the conduct unfeasible.'
Determining when an interference with a public right is unrea-
sonable depends upon whether: (1) the conduct involves a signif-
icant interference with the public health, safety, peace, comfort,
or convenience; (2) the conduct is proscribed by statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation; or (3) the conduct is of a continuing nature
or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect and has a
1, See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100 (1977).
2. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 86, 87, at 618-19 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4. Id. § 826.
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significant effect upon the public right.' In addition to being un-
reasonable, the interference must be substantial,' which is de-
fined as a significant harm to another person.' Thus, the rights
of the person offended by the conduct are balanced against
those of the offender.'
The power to abate nuisances is an essential aspect of the
police power, an ancient and fundamental element of the gov-
ernment's duty to protect its citizens. This power may be exer-
cised in different forms by the legislature, the executive, or the
judiciary. Legislation in many states addresses the prevention
and abatement of nuisances. Statutes may define and prohibit
public nuisances in general terms9 or define specific activities as
public nuisances. 10 Although particular legislation may provide
remedies and sanctions,11 ultimate authority to abate nuisances
rests with the courts. The judiciary, using its inherent powers at
law and in equity with the traditional remedies of damages and
injunction, proceeds on an ad hoc basis to determine what con-
stitutes a nuisance with or without the aid of legislation. 2
Traditionally, health authorities have been vested with the
power to declare and abate nuisances dangerous to public
health. 3 The abatement power may extend to the restriction or
5. Id. § 821B.
6. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 88, at 626.
7. Id.
8. Klar, Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Torts, 17 OTTAWA L. REv. 325,
388 (1985).
9. For example, see OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.01(C) (Anderson 1988), which
provides: "'Nuisance' means that which is defined and declared by statutes to be such
.... " See also S.C. CODE RES. 61-46 (1976) (defining nuisance as "whatever is danger-
ous to human health" and offering many examples).
10. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.04 (Anderson Supp. 1988):
No person shall cause pollution or place or cause to be placed any sewage,
industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of
any waters of the state, and any such action is hereby declared to be a public
nuisance, except in such cases where the director of environmental protection
has issued a valid and unexpired permit. ...
See also id. §§ 3767.01-.99 (defining a variety of activities as nuisances, including main-
taining houses of prostitution and obscenity, obstruction of waterways, and defiling
springs and wells).
11. See, e.g., id. §§ 3767.01-.99 (remedies and sanctions include injunctions, taxes,
sale of property, criminal prosecution).
12. Public nuisance was a common-law crime, as well as a tort. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, § 821B comment b (1979).
13. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 24 (1968).
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prohibition of a business that is dangerous to the public health 14
and to the destruction of private property.
15
Nuisance law is uniquely adaptable to changing times. Since
public nuisance is not susceptible of precise definition, it has
been applied to a wide variety of activities allegedly injurious to
the public health, safety, and welfare. For example, courts have
found public nuisances to include such things as the keeping of
diseased animals, 6 storing explosives, shooting fireworks in the
streets, 8 practicing medicine unlawfully,9 maintaining a house
of prostitution 0 or a gambling house,2 ' bullfighting,22 using pub-
lic profanity, 23 making loud noises, 24 producing odors, smoke
dust, and vibrations,25 obstructing a highway or navigable water-
way,26 and being a common scold. At times a nuisance appears
to be anything that society views as intolerable. In fact, one
South Carolina court has defined nuisance as "anything which
works hurt, inconvenience, or damage; anything which essen-
tially interferes with the enjoyment of life or property.' ' 28 This
14. Id. § 25.
15. Id. § 41. See also Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal. App. 2d 697,
345 P.2d 261 (1959) (city has authority to demolish dilapidated hotel); Hebron Savings
Bank v. City of Salisbury, 259 Md. 294, 269 A.2d 597 (1970) (if city demolishes mort-
gaged house, mortgagee entitled to compensation only if house not nuisance); Burns v.
Mayor of Midland, 247 Md. 548, 234 A.2d 162 (1967) (city has authority to demolish
dangerous building).
16. See, e.g., Browning v. Belue, 22 Ala. App. 437, 116 So. 509 (1928); Patterson v.
Rosenwald, 222 Mo. App. 973, 6 S.W.2d 664 (1928).
17. See, e.g., State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169 S.W. 267 (1914).
18. See, e.g., Landau v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 48, 72 N.E. 631 (1904).
19. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collet v. Scopel, 316 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1958).
20. See, e.g., State v. Navy, 123 W. Va. 722, 17 S.E.2d 626 (1941).
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 187 S.W.2d 327
(1945); State ex rel. Johnson v. Hash, 144 Neb. 495, 13 N.W.2d 716 (1944).
22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (1907).
23. See, e.g., Wilson v. Parent, 228 Or. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
24. See, e.g., People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930); cf. State v.
Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372 (1942) (playing of music not a nuisance per se but
may become one by reason of noise it makes to annoyance of neighborhood).
25. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1952); Soap Corp. v. Reynolds, 178 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1950); State v. Primeau, 70 Wis. 2d
109, 422 P.2d 302 (1966).
26. See, e.g., Pilgrim Plywood Corp. v. Melendy, 110 Vt. 12, 1 A.2d 700 (1938); cf.
Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959) (enclosure by construc-
tion of overhanging building).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mohn, 52 Pa. 243 (1866); cf. State ex rel. Burgum
v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957) (loan shark).
28. See Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 295, 318 S.E.2d 18, 23 (Ct. App. 1984).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss2/4
THE SUFFOLK SYNDROME
amorphous and mutable quality seems to vex legal scholars more
than it does the courts. 2 9 Yet this adaptability explains nuisance
law's survival in environmental litigation.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Congress has enacted legislation in all areas of environmen-
tal law. The following are major federal statutes classified by the
type of pollution they address:
A. Water Pollution
Clean Water Act (CWA)30
B. Drinking Water
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)31
C. Groundwater
SDWA, CWA, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 2  Comprehensive Environment Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
33
D. Solid and Hazardous Waste
SDWA, RCRA, CERCLA (Superfund),




In general, the Clean Air Act regulates emissions of air con-
taminants, the Clean Water Act protects water quality by regu-
lating the discharge of pollutants into water, and RCRA protects
land and groundwater by regulating the disposal of solid and
hazardous waste. CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund,
aims at correcting serious environmental problems existing de-
spite regulation, and it focuses on releases and threatened re-
leases of hazardous substances. The term "Superfund" refers to
the trust fund established by the Act to provide money for
cleaning sites contaminated with hazardous substances. The
29. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 86, at 616 ("There is perhaps no
more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word
'nuisance.' ").
30. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-11 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
32. Id. §§ 6901-6987.
33. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
34. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
1989]
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Safe Drinking Water Act protects underground sources of drink-
ing water from contamination by underground injection of
wastes.
With the exception of CERCLA and TOSCA, these acts fol-
low a common pattern. Each creates a pollution-control program
and gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the
power to implement the program by setting national pollution
control standards, issuing permits, and taking enforcement ac-
tions. The acts specify various administrative powers, including
the power to hold hearings, issue orders, impose penalties, and
investigate potential and actual sources of pollution. These pow-
ers fall into three broad categories: (1) rulemaking powers, which
allow the setting of national standards; (2) licensing powers,
which control polluting activities through issuance and denial of
permits; and (3) enforcement powers, which allow the enforce-
ment of standards and permit limits. Enforcement possibilities
include: (1) strict liability and civil penalties for violation of per-
mit conditions, orders, or standards; (2) administrative orders
and injunctions to enforce statutory provisions; (3) criminal pen-
alties for intentional violations.
All major federal environmental statutes also contain almost
identical "citizen suit" provisions. These provisions authorize
"4any person" or "any citizen," in his own behalf, to commence a
civil action in federal district court to enforce the statute's pro-
visions." Through these citizen suit provisions, the acts provide
for private, as well as government, enforcement.
Finally, the acts are similar in that they typically provide
for delegation of administrative work to the states, provided the
states have an equivalent program. State statutes parallel the
federal statutes by providing for similar state pollution-control
programs with similar powers for state environmental agencies
such as DHEC.
For example, the South Carolina Pollution Control Act3"
prohibits any discharge or release of wastes into the state's envi-
36. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1982 & Supp.
1988); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); Safe Drink-
ing Water Act § 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 1983); Resource Conversation and Recov-
ery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); Clean Air Act § 7604, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 1983); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (West Supp. 1988).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-10 to -350 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
[Vol. 40
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ronment, unless in compliance with a DHEC permit.38 DHEC is
given regulatory authority to establish standards for water and
air quality, discharges of water pollutants, and emissions of air
contaminants. 9 Permits are required for the construction and
operation of pollution sources20 and DHEC may issue, deny, re-
voke, suspend, and modify these permits once issued."1 DHEC
may also enforce the Act and regulations through administrative
orders or judicial process.4 2 Violations are subject to civil and
criminal penalties.43 With this authority, DHEC qualifies for
federal authorization under both the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act. DHEC also has used similar powers under the state
Hazardous Waste Management Act 4 and state Safe Drinking
Water Act" to qualify for authorization under RCRA and the
federal Safe Drinking Water Act.
CERCLA is unique among the federal statutes. It primarily
creates a remedial program rather than a preventive regulatory
program. CERCLA empowers the federal government to respond
to releases of hazardous substances into the environment either
by requiring removal and cleanup by responsible parties or by
undertaking remedial activities itself and seeking reimburse-
ment from the responsible parties.46 It creates sweeping poten-
tial liabilities for persons who generate, transport, treat, store, or
dispose of hazardous substances.
47
Congress substantially revised CERCLA in 1986 by passing
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act,4' com-
monly known as SARA. SARA created a new regulatory program
under Title III, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act.4 9 This legislation subjects industries to an array of
38. Id. § 48-1-90(a).
39. Id. §§ 48-1-40, -50(23), -60.
40. Id. § 48-1-110.
41. Id. § 48-1-50(5).
42. Id. §3 48-1-50, -120, -130, -150, -220.
43. Id. §§ 48-1-320, -330.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. §3 44-56-10 to -330 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. 3§ 44-55-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
47. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
48. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9605-9975
(West Supp. 1988)).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West Supp. 1988).
1989]
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reporting requirements relating not only to releases of hazardous
substances but also to inventories and hazard communication
standards.5" These requirements are designed to prepare com-
munities and emergency response authorities for the contingen-
cies of chemical accidents.
State participation is an important component of CERCLA
but not in the same manner as under the other statutes. No gen-
eral plan exists for development of equivalent state programs or
for delegation of administrative authority to state environmental
agencies. Nevertheless, some states have enacted varied statutes
similar to CERCLA 1
By identifying potential avenues of pollution and establish-
ing a general program of controls for specific sources, federal and
state environmental regulation attempts to prevent pollution
problems before they occur. In contrast, nuisance law is largely a
case-by-case method of reacting to such problems after they
occur.
IV. CASE STUDY: SUFFOLK CHEMICAL COMPANY
A. Plant History
In 1979 Suffolk Chemical Company, a division of United
Chemicals, Inc., began operation of a modestly sized chemical
plant near Chapin, South Carolina, a small community outside
Columbia. Its operations began without incident and were lim-
ited to the receipt, repackaging, and distribution of various
chemicals. Because Suffolk was merely a distribution plant and
- at least in theory - did not generate, treat, or dispose of any
waste, the state did not require the company to obtain permits
for environmental activities.2
In January 1981 DHEC was notified of the presence of caus-
tic materials in a small wet-weather stream, a ditch that flowed
from the Suffolk plant through neighboring property and ulti-
mately into a tributary of Lake Murray. Investigation revealed
50, See id. §§ 11021-11023.
51. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-101 to -201 (1982 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65-3452 to -3459 (1985 & Supp. 1987); McH Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.601-.611
(West 1984 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-701 to -715 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-56-160 to -200 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
52. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
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that a large quantity of sodium hydroxide 53 had been released
into the stream. Containment and cleanup of the spill took sev-
eral weeks. The spill apparently resulted from damage to a valve
on a sodium hydroxide tank and was aggravated by employees'
efforts to wash out the spilled caustic material, which thereby
flushed larger quantities into the wet-weather stream.
This incident prompted further investigation that revealed
that Suffolk had an unpermitted lagoon on site for disposing of
drum washwater. In June 1981 DHEC issued to Suffolk the first
of a series of administrative consent orders that addressed the
sodium hydroxide spill, the unpermitted lagoon, and other sub-
jects, including a smaller spill of potassium hydroxide 54 into the
same wet-weather stream. The order made no findings of fact or
conclusions of law. It did, however, recite DHEC's jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. The order directed Suf-
folk to take certain corrective actions, including development of
an appropriate spill prevention, control, and countermeasure
plan, as well as construction of an adequate containment system
to hold any materials that might be spilled on site.
In early 1982 DHEC issued another administrative order
addressing still more "incidents," including a spill of 1, 1, 1-
trichloroethane, 5 and revising the schedule for completion of
the containment structure. This order also recognized the possi-
bility, apparently expressed by Suffolk management, that the
plant would be closed for business reasons. The order did not
require closure, but mentioned voluntary closure as an option
that would release the company from certain responsibilities and
incur others.
In August 1982 two chlorine gas leaks occurred in rapid suc-
cession, causing consternation in the community in the first in-
stance and an evacuation in the second .5  The result was an
53. Sodium hydroxide, commonly known as caustic soda or lye, is an important
commercial caustic. It is highly corrosive to animal and vegetable tissue and is listed as a
hazardous substance under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 table 302.4 (1987).
54. Potassium hydroxide, also known as caustic potash, is similar in properties to
sodium hydroxide. It is extremely corrosive and is a listed CERCLA hazardous sub-
stance. See id.
55. 1, 1, 1-trichlorethane, also known as methyl chloroform, is an organic com-
pound used as an industrial solvent. It is irritating to eyes and mucous membranes and
is listed as a CERCLA hazardous substance because of toxicity. See id.
56. Chlorine is a dense, greenish-yellow, distomic gas with many uses including dis-
infection and purification of water and the manufacture of bleach and synthetic chemi-
1989]
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emergency order from DHEC requiring the plant to cease opera-
tion and to show cause why it should not be closed permanently.
After a formal hearing on the emergency order, DHEC allowed
the company to reopen the plant and resume part of its opera-
tions. DHEC conditioned reopening upon completion of the con-
tainment structure required by the previous order. Chlorine gas
operations were not allowed to resume until Suffolk had insti-
tuted new management, personnel training, and safety proce-
dures to satisfy both DHEC and the community. Before the end
of 1982, the plant was in full operation again.
Because the emergency order and emergency hearing were
confined to a narrow set of issues and were resolved, at least
temporarily, to the satisfaction of both parties, they did not
delve deeply into the question of DHEC's authority to close the
plant. As an emergency measure, the order seemed well founded
on express statutory authority to deal with public health and en-
vironmental catastrophes. Section 44-1-140 of the South Caro-
lina Code, as amended, empowers DHEC to make "orders and
rules to meet any emergency not provided for by general rules
and regulations, for the purpose of suppressing nuisances dan-
gerous to the public health and communicable, contagious and
infectious diseases and other danger to the public life and
health."57 The state Pollution Control Act also contains an
emergency powers provision:
Whenever the Department finds that an emergency exists re-
quiring immediate action to protect the public health or prop-
erty, the Department, with concurrent notice to the Governor,
may without notice or hearing issue an order reciting the exis-
tence of such an emergency and requiring that such action be
taken as the Department deems necessary to meet the
emergency. 8
Although the emergency order recited the existence of a nui-
sance dangerous to public health, the chief question at the hear-
ing was the existence and nature of the emergency, rather than
the authority to deal with it.
After two relatively uneventful years, DHEC again received
cals. It is toxic and is a listed CERCLA hazardous substance. See id.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-290 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
[Vol. 40
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reports of a spill of an unknown substance into the wet-weather
stream in August 1985. Investigators found that the substance
was a caustic-type material, apparently bleach manufactured as
a by-product of the chlorine operations at the plant. The extent
and effects of the spill were strikingly similar to those of the
sodium hydroxide spill of 1981. The incident revived concerns,
which had lain relatively dormant, about safety of the plant's
operations.
On September 8, 1985, pressure inside a railroad tank car of
hydrochloric acid59 at the plant caused a sudden spill onto the
ground and sent a large vapor cloud into the atmosphere. The
Chapin community was evacuated. Later in the evening the
cloud dissipated, and the evacuation ended, but fear and anger
remained. No emergency order was issued, but attention was di-
rected toward the permanent closure of the Chapin plant.
On October 13, 1985, following another relatively small chlo-
rine gas leak, DHEC issued an order cataloging the incidents at
the plant, listing the compliance and enforcement measures
taken and requiring the plant to cease operations permanently.
The order recited numerous violations of state environmental
statutes and regulations, but more importantly, it declared the
Suffolk plant a public nuisance, dangerous to the public health.
Predictably, Suffolk appealed the order through the admin-
istrative process. Because no pending, imminent threat could be
established easily, DHEC did not attempt to close the plant
pending the appeal. In December 1985, however, following the
discovery of several other problems including the adjacent stor-
age of incompatible chemicals in a warehouse, DHEC issued an-
other emergency order. This order did not require immediate
closure, but it did direct Suffolk to begin removing chemicals
from the site and to cease accepting any new shipments of
chemicals. Following another emergency hearing, a DHEC hear-
ing officer modified the emergency order, mandating correction
of the specific deficiencies noted and restricting the plant's
hours of operation for the duration of the administrative appeal.
During the months of discovery and other prehearing proce-
59. Hydrochloric acid is a strong, highly corrosive acid, sometimes known as muri-
atic acid. It is colorless or slightly yellow and fumes in air. It can cause severe chemical
burns and is toxic by ingestion and inhalation. It is a listed CERCLA hazardous sub-
stance. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 table 302.4 (1987).
1989]
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dures, incidents continued to occur. None, however, were of cat-
astrophic proportions. On August 1, 1986, the fifth day of ad-
ministrative hearings, as testimony was underway, lightning
struck a large outdoor storage tank containing several thousand
gallons of hydrochloric acid. A valve on the tank was destroyed.
The tank's contents were released into a containment area, and
a large cloud of hydrochloric acid vapors was released into the
air. Authorities again evacuated the Chapin community, and
DHEC abruptly terminated the hearings. The containment
structure did not contain all of the material, and some of the
acid surfaced outside the containment area. Other than the va-
por cloud, however, there was no evidence that any liquid had
escaped the plant property. The company voluntarily ceased its
regular operations until cleanup was complete.
After several weeks of additional hearings, but before a re-
port had been issued by the hearing officer, Suffolk agreed with
DHEC to close the plant permanently. The settlement pre-
cluded resolution of the legal issues that had been debated vig-
orously during the course of hearings. Nevertheless, two issues
remain of interest in defining the relationship between public
nuisance law and environmental law. They are: (1) the choice of
action issue - whether nuisance law provides any rights or rem-
edies not otherwise available to the government or private citi-
zens under environmental statutes; and (2) the choice of forum
issue - whether an administrative agency, such as DHEC, has
the authority to bring these issues to a conclusion through its
own administrative process and independently order the final
remedy without recourse to the courts.
B. Choice of Action
1. Environmental Statutes
DHEC has broad powers under the South Carolina Pollu-
tion Control Act6" and the South Carolina Hazardous Waste
Management Act. 1 These acts grant DHEC the full range of ad-
ministrative powers typical under environmental statutes.
DHEC also administers the major environmental programs
60. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-10 to -350 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -510 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
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under the federal statutes described above. These powers and
programs, however, had surprisingly limited applicability to the
situation at Suffolk. Because the plant was a distribution center,
it did not need DHEC permits to operate per se. In fact, few
regular, planned activities at the plant required permits.
The Pollution Control Act requires a permit for any dis-
charge of waste into the environment6 2 and for the construction
or operation of a waste disposal system or air contaminant
source.6 3 The Hazardous Waste Management Act requires a per-
mit for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste.",
The plant, however, did not routinely generate waste products
requiring permits for treatment or disposal, and it did not oper-
ate any continuing sources of air contaminants or water pollu-
tion. Much of DHEC's regulatory interest related to, or resulted
from, spills of plant materials. For example, DHEC required a
permit to construct and operate the spill containment structure
because Suffolk used it as a disposal system to handle materials
that, when spilled, would constitute waste. Although Suffolk
could be expected to spill materials from time to time, spills
were not intended to be a part of daily operations at the plant.
Similarly, a discharge permit issued by DHEC under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)5
was intended primarily to cover run-off and spilled materials
that would be collected in, and discharged from, the contain-
ment system rather than wastewater generated as a routine part
of a production process. Suffolk rarely discharged wastewater
under this permit; instead, it collected the wastewater and trans-
ported it for disposal at an off-site facility owned by a public
entity. It thereby avoided the necessity for providing treatment
of the wastewater to comply with the permit's effluent
limitations.
Because of its limited regulatory authority over Suffolk's
operation, DHEC had no assurance that it could require closure
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-90(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
63. Id. § 48-1-110(a).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
65. Under § 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988), the EPA or any authorized state may issue a permit allowing the discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States otherwise prohibited by the Act. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1311(a) (West 1986). The permit program is known as the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES).
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of the plant simply by revoking a permit. The plant did not
need a permit to operate in the first place, and those permits
that were necessary were collateral to the plant's main produc-
tion process. This distinguished the case from the otherwise
strong support for DHEC's action that was established in
Barker Industries v. South Carolina Department of Health &
Environmental Control." In Barker Industries DHEC had re-
voked a permit to operate a waste-disposal system at a small
chemical plant. Because the plant routinely generated waste, it
could not operate without some method of waste disposal. Revo-
cation of Barker's waste disposal permit forced closure of the
plant even though Barker, like Suffolk, did not need a permit to
operate a chemical plant per se. Revocation of Suffolk's permits
might have posed serious difficulties for the company, but revo-
cation alone would not necessarily have forced plant closure.
Prior to August 1986 DHEC regulation of Suffolk had been an
ad hoc exercise of enforcement power through a series of admin-
istrative orders. Whether this exercise of power could include
simply ordering the plant to close was an open question, at least
insofar as the Pollution Control Act and Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Act were concerned. Nevertheless, DHEC asserted that
its order to close the plant was the next logical step in exercising
the same enforcement powers.
If the plant had been operating under a DHEC permit,
DHEC could have revoked the permit, thus forcing plant closure
as a sanction against repeated violations of an enforcement or-
der or statute. In dealing with Suffolk, DHEC's logic was that a
plant operating without a permit should fare no better when it
repeatedly violates an enforcement order or statute. But to some
extent that reasoning is counter-intuitive because the legislature
has allowed precisely that result by not requiring a permit to
operate the plant in the first place.
The Pollution Control Act does give DHEC the general
power to "abate, control and prevent pollution"6 and specifi-
cally authorizes DHEC to prohibit a discharge of pollutants into
the waters of the state."8 Several of the incidents at Suffolk con-
stituted discharges of pollutants into the waters of the state -
66. 287 S.C. 424, 339 S.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1985).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
68. Id. § 48-1-130.
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for example, the 1981 sodium hydroxide spill and the 1985
bleach spill. DHEC, of course, could order Suffolk to cease any
further discharges. Suffolk then could easily respond by agreeing
to cease any further discharges since it did not plan them in the
first place. The order alone would not force closure of the plant
unless DHEC established that the discharge of pollutants was an
inevitable result of plant operations. Courts may be skeptical of
promises of future good conduct from parties with established
track records of violation,69 and South Carolina courts have held
that present compliance does not erase extensive past viola-
tions.7 0 Even so, the likelihood of recurrence is a legitimate issue
of fact underlying the possibility of closure through an order to
cease discharge.
The Pollution Control Act prohibits any discharge or release
of wastes into the environment - land, air, or waters - without
a permit from DHEC. 1 Virtually any spill by Suffolk could be
asserted as a violation of this prohibition, the sanctions for
which include civil penalties72 and, if intentional or negligent,
criminal penalties. 3 Penalties are imposed either by DHEC,
through an administrative order, or by a court. 4 The Act also
authorizes injunctions to prevent violations. 75 Nowhere, how-
ever, does the Act expressly provide that plant closure is an ap-
propriate remedy or sanction for an unlawful discharge. Argua-
bly, neither DHEC nor a court could order closure relying solely
on the Pollution Control Act, unless closure could be proven
necessary to prevent further violations.
Both the Pollution Control Act and Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Act contain emergency provisions authorizing DHEC to
take virtually any action necessary to protect the public in the
69. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 n.5 (1953) (holding that
a court's power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct
and that it is the "duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by
protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to
anticipate suit, and there is a probability of resumption").
70. Barker Indus. v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 287 S.C. 424,
426, 339 S.E.2d 136, 137 (Ct. App. 1985); Deese v. South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry,
286 S.C. 182, 186, 332 S.E.2d 539, 540-41 (Ct. App. 1985).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-90(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
72. Id. § 48-1-330.
73. Id. § 48-1-320.
74. Id. §§ 48-1-50 (1), (5), (11).
75. Id. § 48-1-50(4).
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event of an environmental emergency or imminent hazard. 76 The
difficulty in applying these emergency powers to Suffolk was the
basic prerequisite for their exercise: the existence of a bona fide
emergency. When the emergency situation ceases, the emergency
power may die with it. DHEC could, and did, argue that the
power to meet an emergency, coupled with its other enforcement
powers, implies authority to take actions necessary to prevent an
emergency from occurring or recurring; however, the question
remained whether DHEC could justify ordering permanent clo-
sure of the plant as a measure necessary to meet or prevent an
emergency.
Closure of a business for environmental violations is not un-
precedented. In Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conservation
Committee" the Utah Supreme Court upheld the power of the
Utah Air Conservation Committee, in an administrative pro-
ceeding, to order a polluter either to apply for a variance from
Utah's air pollution regulations or to close its facility. Like Suf-
folk, Fry committed statutory violations, creating air pollution
that would "unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or
use of property."78 The court specifically ruled that the air pol-
lution statute was not an improper delegation of legislative
power and that an administrative proceeding was the appropri-
ate enforcement vehicle under the Utah statute.7 9 The chief dis-
tinction of Lloyd A. Fry Co. is that Fry's emission merely vio-
lated an opacity standard.
In 1986 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a similar, but
more drastic, enforcement action by the Secretary of the State
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control.
In Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Wilson" the court upheld immedi-
ate prehearing revocation of Formosa's environmental permits,
causing closure of its plant, even though the plant was not then
known to be in violation of any standards."1 In particular, the
court noted Formosa's "long record of flouting environmental
regulations, the two recent severe [vinyl chloride monomer]
76. Id. § 48-1-290.
77. 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975).
78. Id. at 499 (emphasis deleted).
79. See id. at 498-99, 500-01.
80. 504 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1986).
81. See id. at 1087, 1090.
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emissions and the chronic dysfunction of the emission monitor-
ing system." 2 This record supported the Secretary's conclusions
that the company "could not be relied on to operate the plant in
a safe and environmentally sound manner."8 3 The Delaware
court also stated that "a catastrophe need not happen before a
State official can take reasonable emergency action to thwart a
reasonably apparent imminent threat to the public '8
The Secretary's power to revoke permits was not expressly
granted by statute.8 5 The court, however, had little difficulty in-
ferring it from the power to issue the permits and from the very
general power to enforce the statute.86 The Delaware court's rea-
soning could apply to DHEC as well, although in that case it is
not clear that the permit revocation was permanent or that the
court would have upheld the Secretary's power had no permits
been involved.
Superficially, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980s1 appears tailored to
cases such as Suffolk's. Most, and perhaps all, of the releases
that occurred at Suffolk were releases of hazardous substances
that could trigger liability under CERCLA and response actions
by the government. Even so, CERCLA primarily contemplates
actions to remove an immediate threat and actions to remedy
long-term contamination. 8 The most serious threats at Suffolk
were the gas leaks, specifically the chlorine and hydrochloric
acid leaks that dissipated on their own without any governmen-
tal cleanup. In this regard, the response authorities under CER-
CLA lack some effectiveness against a vanishing threat, that is,
recurring incidents that leave no residual contamination. Ironi-
cally, these incidents at the Suffolk site needed no remedial ac-
tion short of plant closure to guarantee that they would not oc-
cur again.
CERCLA would have authorized action by the federal gov-
82. Id. at 1090.
83. Id. DHEC Commissioner Robert S. Jackson made remarkably similar conclu-
sions in the Suffolk case.
84. Id. at 1090. DHEC Commissioner Jackson, in a deposition in the Suffolk case,
stated that the agency did not "have to have bodies in the street before [it] act[s]." Id.
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6060 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
86. 504 A.2d at 1088-89.
87. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
88. See id. § 9604.
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ernment to force Suffolk to clean up or pay for a cleanup of soil
and groundwater contamination that may have been caused by
the chemical spills.8 9 This cleanup, however, would not automat-
ically result in plant closure. Thus, CERCLA seemed to fall
short. The government's response authorities under CERCLA
are broad. Nevertheless, no court yet has held that they include
the authority to require an operating chemical facility to termi-
nate its operations permanently when there is no continuing re-
lease of hazardous substances, other pollutants, or contaminants
presenting an imminent danger to the public health or welfare.
Furthermore, the abatement authorities under CERCLA are
powers of the federal government and not of the state.90 Al-
though South Carolina has a state Superfund law, DHEC's pow-
ers under it appear to be no greater than the federal govern-
ment's under CERCLA.
9 1
In short, environmental statutes placed an array of enforce-
ment powers at DHEC's disposal. On the other hand, none of
them seemed to anticipate the Suffolk syndrome: the recurring
emergency that comes and goes without a trace and the recur-
ring violations of law at a plant that needs no license to operate.
2. Public Health Powers
As the state health department, DHEC possesses the broad
powers traditionally held by such agencies to protect public
health from disease and other threats. Its enforcement capabili-
ties, however, are limited. Violations typically lead only to mis-
demeanor prosecutions within the jurisdiction of a magistrate's
court.9 2 DHEC can seek injunctive relief to prevent violations of
public health regulations and has a general power under the
state's public health statute to make "separate orders and rules
to meet any emergency not provided for by general rules and
89. There was evidence at the hearing relating to soil and groundwater contamina-
tion at the Suffolk site. In the settlement order, Suffolk agreed to assess the extent of
contamination to determine if any cleanup would be necessary.
90. See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir.
1985).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-200 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides that "the provisions of
Section 107 of [CERCLA] . . .are incorporated and adopted herein as the law of this
State."
92. See id. § 44-1-150.
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regulations, for the purpose of suppressing nuisances dangerous
to the public health and communicable, contagious and infec-
tious diseases and other danger to the public life and health.
'93
Thus, the statute codifies the common-law power of health au-
thorities to suppress and abate nuisances, the power that DHEC
principally relied on to close Suffolk Chemical Company's plant
in Chapin.
Traditionally, health authorities have been vested with the
power to declare and abate nuisances dangerous to the public
health. The abatement power may extend both to the restriction
or prohibition of a business that is dangerous to the public
health and to the destruction of private property. These facets
of nuisance law and the police power are crucial because the ex-
istence of a public nuisance may authorize the use of the police
power to destroy private property without compensation to the
owner; if there is no nuisance, plant closure may constitute a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain, requiring
compensation.
9 4
By statute, the General Assembly has expressly granted to
DHEC these traditional powers of health departments to abate
nuisances: "The Department of Health and Environmental Con-
trol is invested with all the rights and charged with all the duties
pertaining to organizations of like character and shall be the sole
advisor of the State in all questions involving the protection of
the public health within its limits."9 5 The traditional powers to
suppress nuisances are preserved in the Pollution Control Act:
93. Id. § 44-1-140.
94. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the
Court stated:
The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the
simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not "taken" anything
when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.
Id. at 491 n.20. "Courts have consistently held that a State need not provide compensa-
tion when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or
abating a public nuisance." Id. at 492 n.22. But see 2 J. SACKmAN & P. NICHOLS, THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.07 (rev. 3d ed. 1985) ("There is no greater magic in the word
'nuisance' than there is in 'police power,' and neither expression can be used as a cloak
to cover an invasion of the constitutional rights of private property.") Sackman and
Nichols may be other examples of legal scholars who are more vexed by nuisance law
than are the courts. See supra text accompanying note 29.
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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Nothing herein contained shall be construed to postpone, stay
or abrogate the enforcement of the provisions of the public
health laws of this State and rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder in respect to discharges causing actual or potential
hazards to public health nor to prevent the Department of
Health and Environmental Control from exercising its right to
prevent or abate nuisances.9 6
One immediate appeal of the nuisance concept in a case such as
this is the ease with which it embraces both public health and
environmental concerns. Under the public health statute, DHEC
has defined nuisances by regulation. This regulation includes
subjects that typically are regulated under environmental au-
thority, as well as public health authority, and state environ-
mental departments have asserted nuisance claims in many
cases in conjunction with environmental enforcement actions.
History has demonstrated that nuisance claims may be used
in conjunction with statutory causes of action and may support
or be supported by a statutory claim. For example, in Stoddard
v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority"' the plaintiff
brought a state common-law nuisance claim in federal court
along with a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. He alleged
violations by the Sewer Authority of the effluent limitations of
its NPDES permit and sought civil penalties. He also, however,
asserted that the effluent from the Sewer Authority's treatment
plant had polluted the lake on which he lived and had created a
nuisance condition for which he sought damages. The nuisance
claim allowed the court to consider aspects of the sewage dis-
charge that it otherwise might not have properly considered in a
citizen suit since they did not relate to effluent limitations in the
Authority's discharge permit. The nuisance conditions in the
lake were caused largely by nutrients (phosphorus and nitrogen)
in the wastewater, but the Authority's permit placed no limits
on the discharge of nutrients. Therefore, no permit violations
existed. The citizen suit was based largely on violations of the
fecal coliform limits in the permit, and this claim entitled the
plaintiff to request a civil penalty. A penalty is payable to the
United States Treasury, however, and not to the plaintiff in a
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-280 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
97. See S.C. CODE REGS. 61-46 (1976).
98. 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 40
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss2/4
THE SUFFOLK SYNDROME
citizen suit. The plaintiff's nuisance claim allowed him to ex-
pand the statutory cause of action to recover damages to both
himself and his property.
On the other hand, a nuisance claim may be directly sup-
ported by provisions of a related statute. In New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.99 the State asserted a common-law public nuisance
action for abatement of a hazardous waste problem in addition
to its claims under CERCLA for the recovery of response costs.
In allowing the State's nuisance claim, the Second Circuit noted
that Shore Realty's continuing violations of state hazardous
waste statutes constituted a nuisance per se. In the Suffolk case,
DHEC could use the same theory against Suffolk because recent
authority in South Carolina stands for the same proposition. In
Neal v. Darby00 the court of appeals found that a solvent recla-
mation company's landfill was a public nuisance for two reasons:
its proximity to residential areas and a primary drinking water
source, as well as its influence on the public. Distinguishing be-
tween nuisance per accidens and nuisance per se, the court
noted that if an activity is in a remote and unfrequented local-
ity, it will not be a nuisance per se unless malum in se - or
wrong in itself. Otherwise, to be a nuisance per se the activity
must take place where members of the public are likely to come
within the range of its influence. The court also implicitly recog-
nized that the real question in nuisance cases is whether the ac-
tivity is a public nuisance at all and not whether it is a nuisance
per se or per accidens. Once a court concludes that a nuisance
exists, the label it places on the nuisance is immaterial. Viola-
tion of a state environmental statute may constitute malum in
se and, thereby, be a public nuisance.
Shore Realty cited a previous New York case, State v.
Schenectady Chemicals, Inc.101 In Schenectady Chemicals the
New York Supreme Court held that the State had proved a nui-
sance claim against a chemical company whose dumping of
chemical wastes caused surface and groundwater problems fif-
teen to thirty years later.10 2 The suit arose because the chemical
99. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
100. 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984).
101. 117 Misc. 2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1983), modified, 103 A.D.2d 33,
479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984).
102. 117 Misc. 2d at 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
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company had refused to pay its portion of the cleanup costs.'0 3
Unlike Shore Realty, however, the Schenectady Chemicals
court held that the State did not prove a statutory violation.1
0 4
The Shore Realty court cited the modified opinion of Sche-
nectady Chemicals0 5 for the notion that "release or threat of
release of hazardous waste into the environment unreasonably
infringes upon a public right and thus is a public nuisance as a
matter of New York law.'1 0 6 For example, a statute may estab-
lish a public right to clean air and water and a standard of con-
duct with respect to that right, such as effluent limitations under
the NPDES. Violation of that statute, then, would constitute a
public nuisance. Rather than preempting common-law nuisance,
the proliferation of statutory environmental controls simply pro-
vides additional grounds for proving the existence of public
nuisances.
Courts tend to accept the proposition that violation of a
statute is nuisance per se without discussion or any apparent
qualifying criteria. Yet not all statutory violations will constitute
public nuisances. Borrowing from the idea of negligence per se,
some simple criteria may be helpful in governing the nuisance
per se concept. 0 7 First, the purpose of the statute should be ex-
amined. If the interests the statute is designed to protect do not
fall within the scope of those traditionally implicating a nui-
sance claim - such as public health, safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience - then a violation of the statute should not consti-
tute a nuisance per se. For example, failure to file a tax return
would not constitute a nuisance per se because violation of tax
laws does not implicate an interest traditionally protected by
nuisance law.
Second, the statute should create a specific standard by
which the defendant's conduct or activity can be measured. A
general prohibition on nuisance activities will not suffice because
the plaintiff must prove the nuisance in order to prove a viola-
tion of the statute. On the other hand, a statute prohibiting sew-
103. Id. at 962, N.Y.S.2d at 974.
104. Id. at 964, N.Y.S.2d at 977.
105. 103 A.D.2d 33, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010.
106. 759 F.2d at 1051 (citing Schenectady Chemicals, 103 A.D.2d at 37, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 1013).
107. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 286, 288.
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age discharges in excess of specified numeric levels prescribes a
specific measure of a defendant's performance.
Third, the interests asserted by the plaintiff must be among
those nuisance-type interests protected by the statute. If the
plaintiff is a governmental official or agency seeking abatement
of a public nuisance, however, this element is less important and
can be satisfied as long as the official or agency asserts a public
right protected or established by the statute.
Fourth, the statutory violation should injure or threaten the
nuisance interests asserted by the plaintiff. This element re-
quires that the claim focus on a particular statutory prohibition
or requirement and not merely on the broader provisions of an
entire act. For example, the unlawful discharge of pollutants in
violation of the Clean Water Act could support a nuisance claim,
but the falsification of reports, also prohibited by the Act, would
not.
The gist of these criteria is that a nuisance per se is still a
nuisance claim, not a different cause of action, and that there
should be no "nuisance in the air" any more than there is "negli-
gence in the air."10 Under these criteria, if a court finds that a
statute specifies a standard of conduct for the defendant to pro-
tect a plaintiff from nuisance conditions and further finds that
the defendant has threatened the protected interest by violating
that standard, then the court may be justified in finding a nui-
sance per se.10 9 If not, the defendant still may be guilty of main-
taining a nuisance, but not a nuisance per se, based on the statu-
tory violation. Of course, the plaintiff still must prove injury and
proximate cause, and the court then must consider the extent of
injury and the appropriate remedy. The court, however, need
not consider the reasonableness and value of the defendant's ac-
tivity compared to its undesirable effects because the statute
would establish, as in case of negligence per se, a conclusive pre-
sumption of unreasonableness. Of course, if the statute expressly
defines the prohibited conduct as a nuisance, the court need not
108. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928)
(quoting F. POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed.)).
109. The Restatement of Torts suggests some additional criteria for determining
when negligence per se should not apply. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 288. Among
them is whether a statute is intended to protect exclusively the general public or the
state. These criteria would seldom, if ever, bar the use of nuisance per se in case of a
public nuisance challenged by a public authority.
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engage in this analysis at all.
One advantage of establishing nuisance per se is that the
plaintiff should have an easier time with the question of remedy.
If the nuisance arises because of statutory violations, a court
should be easily convinced to enjoin the conduct. Once the legis-
lature has determined that certain activities are unlawful, a
court does not need to balance equities or weigh the value of
allowing those activities to continue; the legislature already has
performed that balancing.
Nevertheless, a finding of a nuisance per se at the Suffolk
plant would not necessarily have resulted in plant closure. The
individual releases of hazardous substances were what gave rise
to the nuisance claim. If the releases were violations of statute,
they would constitute a nuisance per se, but the plant's exis-
tence and operation, otherwise lawful, would not necessarily be a
nuisance per se. Only by the frequency and probable recurrence
of such statutory violations could DHEC assert that they were
an inherent and inevitable feature of the plant and that its en-
tire continued operation was a nuisance per se. In Shore Realty
the court referred to the defendant's continuing violations of the
New York Environmental Conservation law by its storage and
disposal of hazardous waste without necessary permits.11 It
would be difficult to prove that a nuisance exists on the basis of
a single statutory violation and still more difficult to prove that
an otherwise lawful activity is a nuisance per se without demon-
strating a continuing pattern of operation in violation of law.
Without that demonstration, the chances of securing the remedy
of plant closure are severely lessened.
The broad array of available remedies gives the nuisance
claim its greatest value to the government in conjunction with a
statutory enforcement action. In its case against Suffolk Chemi-
cal Company, DHEC's ultimate goal was permanent plant clo-
sure. While other remedies - such as civil penalties and tempo-
rary corrective actions - were available, DHEC felt that they
were inadequate. DHEC selected public nuisance not merely as
an additional claim but as an umbrella cause of action over all
its other claims. DHEC could assert both violations of various
statutes and regulations as well as the independent existence of
110. See 759 F.2d at 1051.
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a public nuisance. It also could claim that the statutory and reg-
ulatory violations constituted a nuisance per se. By stating its
case in this fashion, DHEC could argue that the statutory reme-
dies for the statutory violations included plant closure as a
means of pollution abatement. Further, it could argue that a
nuisance claim independently justified plant closure as a means
of nuisance abatement. Overall, DHEC could argue forcefully
that statutory violations coupled with a nuisance per se clearly
authorized closure of the plant to abate pollution and the public
nuisance and to prevent the continued existence or recurrence of
conditions that were unlawful and harmful to the environment
and to the public.
Of course, DHEC's position raised difficult questions of fact.
These included, above all, convincing the hearing officer, the
DHEC board, and a reviewing court not only that Suffolk's plant
was a public nuisance but that the incidents associated with its
operation in the past were an inevitable and inherent feature of
its operations that would continue if the plant were not closed.
C. Choice of Forum
The second issue raised by DHEC's efforts to close Suffolk
Chemical's plant is the choice of forum. If DHEC could over-
come the first obstacle, the choice of action, it still would be
questioned for choosing to adjudicate its claims within its own
administrative process instead of in court.
An administrative agency has only those powers conferred
by the legislature.111 Unlike a court, it has no inherent powers.112
An agency's powers, however, include not only those expressly
conferred but also those that must be implied for the agency to
carry out its duties effectively. 1 " These rules are well settled and
easily stated in South Carolina, but their application is not as
111. See Triska v. Department of Health & Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 190, 194, 355
S.E.2d 531, 533 (1987) (citing South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. South Carolina Tax Bd.,
278 S.C. 556, 560, 299 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1983)).
112. See Carolina Water Serv. v. South Carolina Public Serv. Comm'n, 272 S.C. 81,
87, 248 S.E.2d 924, 927 (1978); Beard-Laney, Inc. v. Darby, 213 S.C. 380, 49 S.E.2d 564
(1948).
113. See City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 199, 202,
355 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1987).
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easily resolved.11 4 DHEC has no specific statutory power to or-
der an operating facility to close; that authority exists, if at all,
only by implication from its more general express powers.
Therefore, to pursue its chosen course of action in an adminis-
trative forum, DHEC had to demonstrate its power to act di-
rectly without the assistance of the courts.
Initially, one might ask why DHEC would choose the ad-
ministrative forum, possibly inviting a challenge to its jurisdic-
tion. Several reasons might explain this choice. First, the choice
gave DHEC some tactical advantages. It exercised greater con-
trol over the forum, had greater familiarity with procedures,
and, theoretically, had greater control over the timing of the
hearing and of prehearing matters. Second, the choice made
greater use of agency expertise. In an administrative proceeding,
agency employees are more likely to be accepted as experts with
less laborious demonstration of qualifications simply because of
their internal value to the agency. Furthermore, an agency hear-
ing officer or governing board often is wary of creating a credi-
bility problem for the agency by finding that its own officials or
employees are not qualified as experts in the areas of their em-
ployment. The agency also could reduce its evidentiary burden
by taking official notice of technical or scientific facts within its
expertise, matters that might require laborius testimony in
court.1
5
A third, more policy-oriented reason to choose the agency
forum is the desire to work the problem into a "regulatory"
mode by achieving an administrative order rather than a court
order. DHEC used this method in the past to achieve a measure
of control over Suffolk. By the entry of a number of administra-
tive orders after incidents at the plant, DHEC ostensibly had
established jurisdiction over part of Suffolk's operations.
Whether or not it succeeded in closing Suffolk's plant perma-
nently, DHEC would have more control in the future over the
implementation and enforcement of its own orders than a court
order. Thus, the choice of the administrative forum may have
been for the purpose of clearly establishing DHEC's jurisdiction
114. Within one month's time in 1987, the supreme court decided two cases involv-
ing DHEC's implied powers, one in favor of the agency, City of Columbia, 292 S.C. 199,
355 S.E.2d 536, and one against the agency, Triska 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531.
115. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-330(4) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
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A final reason for selecting the agency forum was the need
to demonstrate that DHEC had carefully and exhaustively con-
sidered the facts and the law before declaring the plant to be a
public nuisance. As a matter of internal policy and practice, the
agency might have felt that an order from its governing board,
issued after full administrative hearings and affirmatively de-
claring the Suffolk plant a public nuisance, would place it in the
best posture in any subsequent judicial proceeding. If the order
needed to be taken to court for enforcement, the findings of the
DHEC board would carry substantially greater weight than the
agency's bare allegation of nuisance in a complaint filed in court
in the first instance. This last reason for choosing the agency
forum rests upon DHEC's understanding of the distribution of
power in South Carolina between the courts and administrative
agencies and its interpretation of the intent of the General As-
sembly and the mandates of the supreme court.
Under the common-law primary jurisdiction doctrine, a
court will decline to hear a case until an administrative agency
with specialized statutory jurisdiction over the subject has con-
sidered it.'"' This is so even though the court may have concur-
rent jurisdiction. 1" 7 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is re-
lated to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is distinguishable, however,
in that typically it is invoked in a dispute between private par-
ties, whereas exhaustion is required before a citizen may chal-
lenge the agency itself in court." 8
In South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Carolina
Power & Light Co." 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed the primary jurisdiction doctrine without calling it by
name. The court held that the plaintiff public service authority
could not bring an original action in court to enjoin activities of
the defendant power company because resolution of the dispute
would require a determination of the utility's service areas. This
issue, according to the court, was a "regulatory matter which has
been placed within the original jurisdiction of the Public Service
116. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.1 (2d ed. 1983).
117. See id.
118. See infra notes 121-135.
119. 244 S.C. 466, 137 S.E.2d 507 (1964).
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Commission, and over which the courts have no jurisdiction ex-
cept by way of review. ' 120 Carolina Power & Light manifests the
court's tendency to defer to agencies on matters within their
jurisdiction.
This tendency more often has been manifested in the
court's decisions on exhaustion of remedies. In Meredith v. Elli-
ott 21 the court deemed it "well settled in this State that gener-
ally the exhaustion of administrative relief available to a party is
necessary before the party can seek redress in the courts.
'1 22
Meredith was decided before enactment of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA)125 in 1976;124 the APA, however, expressly
preserves the requirement of exhaustion of remedies before judi-
cial review. 2 5 The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently ap-
plied the exhaustion doctrine in the enforcement context when
DHEC brought an action to enjoin the operation of a restaurant
without a license.126 The defendant raised his alleged entitle-
ment to the license as a defense, claiming DHEC had acted un-
constitutionally. The court of appeals rejected the argument be-
cause the defendant had not pursued the administrative process
by allowing DHEC to make a decision to grant or deny the li-
cense. The court noted that the "evaluation of the adequacy of a
sewage disposal system [the specific point of contention in the
case] is uniquely within the competency of DHEC, not the
courts"1 27 and admonished the trial judge for displacing the ad-
ministrative process by considering technical issues that the leg-
120. Id. at 477, 137 S.E.2d at 511.
121. 247 S.C. 335, 147 S.E.2d 244 (1966).
122. Id. at 343, 147 S.E.2d at 248. See also Columbia Developers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269
S.C. 486, 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977) (exhaustion required when action presents mixed ques-
tions of fact and law). But see Andrews Bearing Corp. v. Brady, 261 S.C. 533, 201 S.E.2d
241 (1973) (exhaustion not required when action raises only a pure issue of law); Green-
vile Baptist Ass'n v. Greenville County Treasury, 281 S.C. 325, 315 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App.
1984) (exhaustion not required when agency has acted without jurisdiction).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1988).
124. 1976 S.C. Acts 671. The Act was completely rewritten and re-enacted in 1977.
See 1977 S.C. Acts 176.
125. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986), provides that "a party who
has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency. . . is entitled to
judicial review under this article and Article 1."
126. See South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control v. Armstrong, 293 S.C.
209, 359 S.E.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1987).
127. Id. at 215, 359 S.E.2d at 305.
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islature had committed to DHEC's discretion. 2 " The opinion
termed the lack of developed evidence before the trial court
"symptomatic of the fact that the administrative process was
not completed."'
29
Case law on the nature of judicial review of agency actions,
especially after enactment of the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act, i30 seems to establish further the supreme
court's definite preference for full administrative resolution of
agency issues. The court seems concerned that matters requiring
agency judgment and expertise are addressed thoroughly and
that a complete agency record is made prior to review by a
court.'' In the context of judicial review, of course, this prefer-
ence is fully supported by, and consistent with, the APA. The
supreme court has described this preference in constitutional
terms,"' which strongly suggests that it would look favorably
upon administrative prosecution of enforcement matters prior to
seeking court enforcement. 33 This approach also suggests that
judicial enforcement of administrative orders, like judicial re-
view of their validity, would be based on a complete agency rec-
ord.13 4 The circuit courts, thus, are spared many technical issues,
as well as the questions frequently arising in the enforcement
context that require the exercise of specialized judgment and
discretion in fashioning remedies.13 5
Like many other agencies, DHEC has been granted many
specific regulatory powers by statute and a general power of ad-
128. See id. at 215-16, 359 S.E.2d at 305.
129. Id. at 214, 359 S.E.2d at 305.
130. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1988).
131. See, e.g., Midlands Util., Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Con-
trol, 287 S.C. 483, 339 S.E.2d 862 (1986) (review confined to agency record); Guerard v.
Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981) (court not to substitute judicial discretion
and judgment for that of agency better equipped to decide technical factual issues); see
also South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control v. Armstrong, 293 S.C. 209, 359
S.E.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1987).
132. See Guerard, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981).
133. Cf. Orr v. Clyburn, 277 S.C. 536, 290 S.E.2d 804 (1982) (noting that judicial
review of exercise of preliminary administrative discretion to begin investigation would
create delays in administrative proceedings).
134. See id. (complaint seeking to enjoin preliminary administrative investigation
falls to present justiciable controversy; noting that judicial review of administrative dis-
cretion would bring many preliminary questions into court that otherwise would be han-
dled in ordinary course of administrative process).
135. See Armstrong, 293 S.C. 209, 359 S.E.2d 302.
1989]
29
Harleston and Harleston: The Suffolk Syndrome: A Case Study in Public Nuisance Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
judication for implementing those specific powers." 6 The Pollu-
tion Control Act gives South Carolina courts concurrent jurisdic-
tion to entertain actions brought by DHEC to enforce provisions
of the Act and DHEC regulations, permits, and orders. 137 Initial
use of the administrative process, followed by judicial enforce-
ment of agency orders only when necessary, is fairly routine
within DHEC. The Suffolk case, however, raises two questions
regarding application of this procedure. First, does the remedy
sought, plant closure, fall outside DHEC's administrative juris-
diction? Second, does invocation of the public nuisance doctrine,
based at least in part on DHEC's public health authorities, limit
DHEC's administrative jurisdiction?
In some cases, the powers granted to DHEC under the Pol-
lution Control Act specify particular remedies. DHEC, for exam-
ple, can issue an order to discontinue a discharge of pollutants
into state waters or to correct an undesirable level of air con-
taminants."3 " The Pollution Control Act, however, does not pro-
vide an exhaustive list of the types of orders that DHEC may
issue. It gives DHEC the authority to conduct hearings, take evi-
dence, and make findings and determinations. 39 Those determi-
nations subsequently may be enforced in court, and violation of
any DHEC order may be grounds for civil and criminal penal-
ties.1 0 This may be taken as a broad grant of adjudicative power
- the power to make decisions case-by-case to implement the
statute.'4 The adjudicative power has been called a "customary
and vital tool in the functional operations of present day admin-
istrative agencies, 42 and this authority in the Act, unspecific as
it is, can only be such a tool.
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-50(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
137. Id. § 48-1-50(4).
138. Id. §§ 48-1-120, -130.
139. Id. § 48-1-50(i).
140. Id. §§ 48-1-50(4), -320, -330.
141. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1946)("[A]n administrative
agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order... .And
the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual ad hoc litigation is
one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."); see
also Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Butler County Mushroom Farm, 499 Pa.
509, 454 A.2d 1 (1982) (statutory grant of agency authority construed to include power to
implement authority). DHEC possesses general rule-making power as well, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-1-30 (Law. Co-op. 1987), and thus may use both rule-making and adjudication
in its "function of filling in the interstices of the Act." Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202.
142. Butler County Mushroom Farm, 499 Pa. at 512, 454 A.2d at 3.
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Nevertheless, the Act cannot be read as granting DHEC an
unrestricted power to hold hearings and make determinations of
any kind. One key to interpreting the scope of DHEC's adjudi-
cative power may be found in the state supreme court's pro-
nouncement on implied powers in Beard-Laney, Inc. v.
Darby.143 "Even a governmental body of admittedly limited
powers is not in a strait jacket in the administration of the laws
under which it operates. Those laws delimit the field which the
regulations may cover.' 4 4 In other words, the grant of adjudica-
tive power is a procedural grant; the agency must possess sub-
stantive jurisdiction over the field in which it exercises its proce-
dural powers.
DHEC's substantive jurisdiction under the Pollution Con-
trol Act is defined in its broadest terms in two sections of the
Act. Section 48-1-100 gives DHEC "jurisdiction over the quality
of the air and waters of the State of South Carolina... [and]
jurisdiction over those matters involving real or potential threats
to the health of the people of South Carolina.' 45 Section 48-1-
20 gives DHEC the "authority to abate, control and prevent pol-
lution."' 46 The supreme court has said that "DHEC is charged
with the responsibility of insuring that the waters of the State
are as free of pollutants as possible. The delegation of authority
to an administrative agency is construed liberally when the
agency is concerned with the protection of the health and wel-
fare of the public.' 4 7 A liberal reading of DHEC's general adju-
dicative authority is warranted. Careful attention, however,
should be given to the specific regulatory controls provided in
the statute, such as permits for discharge, construction, and op-
eration, and the specific remedies at issue. In Triska v. Depart-
ment of Health & Environmental Control'48 the court rejected
DHEC's arguments for a broad construction of its powers, partly
because it did not believe that the remedy in question - revoca-
tion of a certification under section 401 of the Clean Water Act
- was available within the framework of federal law, state law,
143. 213 S.C. 380, 49 S.E.2d 564 (1948).
144. Id. at 389, 49 S.E.2d at 567 (emphasis in original).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-100 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
146. Id. § 48-1-20.
147. City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 199, 202, 355
S.E.2d 536, 538 (1987).
148. 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987).
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or DHEC regulations relating to such certifications.
Logically, DHEC's determination under its general adjudi-
cative enforcement powers ordinarily may include whatever rem-
edy is appropriate to the violation in question. When the remedy
is permanent closure of the facility, however, and that closure is
not based on the revocation of a permit or some other routine
form of regulatory control, the availability of that remedy be-
comes a serious question because of its resemblance to a "tak-
ing" of property.1 49 Because, in the Suffolk case, DHEC chose to
rely in large part on public nuisance to authorize the remedy of
closure, the "taking" question could be avoided. Even so, the
second question - whether that time-honored public health and
welfare doctrine could be invoked within the administrative ju-
risdiction created by the Pollution Control Act - had to be
faced.
The public health powers provided to DHEC do not spell
out the full panopoly of regulatory authority typical of modern
environmental statutes, including the Pollution Control Act. In
fact, enforcement often proceeds through misdemeanor charges
filed in the magistrate's court. The health law does authorize
DHEC to conduct hearings, 150 to take various other actions, and,
as mentioned above, to make orders to suppress nuisances.' On
the other hand, the law says very little about administrative pro-
cedure. While the powers of state health authorities long have
included the power to abate nuisances, in some instances by di-
rect order,.62 the statute does not clearly define how these tradi-
tional powers are to be exercised in the light of modern adminis-
trative law practice. For a case such as Suffolk's to be brought
solely on the basis of a public nuisance dangerous to the public
health, a simple approach would be for the agency to declare the
plant a nuisance and immediately bring an action in court in the
first instance to enjoin the nuisance.
The statutes creating DHEC, which merged the State Board
of Health and the Pollution Control Authority into one agency,
provide some suggestions about how to reconcile DHEC's health
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
151. Id. § 44-1-140.
152. See S.C. CODE REGS. 61-46 (1976).
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powers and its environmental powers. 53 In 1971 the General As-
sembly added two paragraphs to section 14 of the Pollution Con-
trol Act' in an attempt to delineate the separate jurisdictions
of the Pollution Control Authority and the Board of Health:
The Pollution Control Authority shall be the agency of
State government having jurisdiction over the quality of the air
and waters of the State of South Carolina. They shall develop
and enforce such standards as may be necessary governing
emissions or discharges into the air, streams, lakes or coastal
waters of the State, including waste water discharges.
The State Board of Health shall be the Agency of State
Government having jurisdiction over those matters involving
real or potential threats to the health of the people of South
Carolina, including the handling and disposal of garbage and
refuse; septic tanks; and individual or privately owned systems
for the disposal of offal and human or animal wastes; provided,
that where the effluent from privately owned sewage disposal
systems serving more than two hundred fifty houses shall dis-
charge into a stream or lake of the state, no permit to operate
shall be issued by the Board of Health without agreement of
the Pollution Control Authority.'
55
The Authority and the Board were merged in 1973 with no
amendment to section 14.156 In 1975 the legislature amended
several sections of the Pollution Control Act 5' to substitute
"Board" or "Department" of Health and Environmental Control
for "Authority." In the 1976 recodification, section 14 turned up
as code section 48-1-100 with "Department" inserted in both of
the above-quoted paragraphs, obliterating the distinction." 8
153. See Reorganization Plan No. 10, 1973 S.C. Acts 390 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-1-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-100 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
155. 1971 S.C. Acts 410, at Part II, § 9 (emphasis in original).
156. See 1973 S.C. Acts 390.
157. 1975 S.C. Acts 203. Section 14 was not affected by the amendment.
158. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-100 (Law. Co-op. 1987). The substitution of "De-
partment" in § 48-1-100 was not accomplished through any act of the legislature. It ap-
parently was the idea of the editors of the new code, but the General Assembly implicitly
ratified the change when it adopted the 1976 code as "the only general statutory law of
the State." 1977 S.C. Acts 95. The change was necessary in any event if § 48-1-100 was to
make sense after the merger, and the original legislative intent was clear in the act merg-
ing the agencies, transferring "[a]ll of the functions, powers and duties" of the Board of
Health and Pollution Control Authority to DHEC. See 1973 S.C. Acts No. 390 § 5 (codi-
fied at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
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Likewise, the 1976 recodification replaced the words "State
Board of Health" with DHEC in section 31 of the Pollution
Control Act.159 Section 31 formerly read:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to postpone,
stay or abrogate the enforcement of the provisions of the pub-
lic health laws of this State and rules and regulations promul-
gated hereunder in respect to discharges causing actual or po-
tential hazards to public health nor to prevent the State Board
of Health from exercising its right to prevent or abate
nuisances.160
If the environmental controls of the Pollution Control Act did
not limit the powers of the Board of Health as a separate agency
to abate nuisances, then surely the controls would not limit the
powers of the combined environmental and health agency to do
the same.
With the merger of the two agencies, joint exercise of their
previously separate powers was inevitable because of the overlap
of environmental and health concerns. When the subject of con-
cern implicates both environmental regulations and public
health regulations, DHEC seems to be free to use its administra-
tive powers under the Pollution Control Act to deal with a prob-
lem in one proceeding. It need not deal with a fragment through
the administrative process and another fragment through the
courts, which would raise difficult issues of collateral estoppel
and inconsistent enforcement actions in different fora. Many of
DHEC's powers under the public health laws, of course, have no
relationship to environmental protection. Their implementation
under the administrative powers and procedures of the Pollution
Control Act would be wholly inappropriate. A public nuisance
claim based on violations of the environmental statutes, on the
other hand, is the perfect case for concurrent exercise of health
and environmental authority. The simultaneous exercise of the
power to abate nuisances and the power to abate pollution sup-
ports administrative enforcement through the administrative
process.
159. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-280 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
160. 1970 S.C. Acts 1157 § 31 (emphasis added).
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V. LIMITS ON APPLICABILITY OF THE SUFFOLK SYNDROME
The most obvious factors limiting the usefulness of DHEC's
theories against Suffolk Chemical are the differing regulatory
powers granted by state law to environmental agencies in differ-
ent states. In some states, the environmental agency may have
little or no explicit authority to deal with public nuisances; in
others, its authority may be even more explicit than that dele-
gated to DHEC. An environmental agency may be granted pow-
ers that would render recourse to public nuisance law unneces-
sary. Furthermore, if the agency in question lacks broad general
adjudicative power, the administrative forum for resolution may
be unavailable, forcing the agency to pursue its nuisance claim
in court.
In most states, the environmental agency is not also the
state health agency. Only a handful of states currently combine
the two regulatory structures."' 1 This factor limits, to some ex-
tent, the authority of a purely environmental agency to address
matters that broadly affect the public health and safety if they
do not also fall within the scope of the agency's environmental
regulation. Nuisance abatement may be a power expressly
granted to another agency. Such a grant of authority might im-
ply a limit on the environmental agency's authority in the same
area.
In addition to the variations found among state regulatory
structures and powers, state statutes and regulations may limit
the flexibility of the nuisance doctrine, ironically, by defining it.
If an environmental statute defines a violation of its provisions
as a public nuisance, it may open the door to all the remedies
and procedures available to deal with public nuisances, or it may
limit the available remedies to those specifically provided in the
statute. Statutes and regulations defining nuisance in specific
terms may be construed to limit the concept only to those terms
mentioned. Statutes construed in this manner sap one of nui-
sance law's greatest strengths: its adaptability to new situations.
This also raises a question about whether common-law nui-
sance may be preempted by federal or state statute. A federal
common law of nuisance, based on common-law principles of
161. Those states include Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
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public nuisance,8 2 began with two early twentieth-century Su-
preme Court cases. In Missouri v. Illinois'6 3 Missouri alleged
that the state of Illinois caused typhoid fever in St. Louis by
dumping raw sewage into a canal flowing to the Mississippi
River. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.' Georgia alleged
harm to its forests from noxious sulfur dioxide fumes from the
Tennessee Copper Company. In both cases, the Court invoked
common law to deal with air and water pollution disputes.
In 1972 the Supreme Court again found a federal common
law "when we deal with air or water in their ambient or inter-
state aspects" in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1).
165
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
(FWPCA) of 1972,166 however, were enacted a few months after
Milwaukee L
In 1981 the Court found in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
(Milwaukee 11)167 that the FWPCA, as amended, eliminated the
need for the federal common law of nuisance in the area of in-
terstate water pollution. A few weeks after Milwaukee II, the
Court reinforced this holding in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,168 abolishing
federal common law from the area of water pollution. These two
cases bring into question the use of the federal common law of
nuisance as a cause of action in federal courts in all areas of
environmental law in which legislation has been enacted - in-
cluding solid and hazardous waste, air pollution, drinking water
and groundwater contamination, nuclear waste, and water pollu-
tion. They do not, however, question the continued viability of
public nuisance as a cause of action in state enforcement.
Courts typically have read Milwaukee 11 as holding that rel-
evant federal environmental statutes have replaced the federal
162. Comment, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of Nui-
sance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rav. 41, 43 (1983).
163. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
164. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
165. 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
166. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1251-1376 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988)). The Act was further amended in 1977 by the
Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1251.1376) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988)). With the 1977 amendments, the name of the Act
was changed to the Clean Water Act.
167. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
168. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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common law of nuisance. The Clean Air Act, RCRA, and CER-
CLA have been held to preempt federal common law in various
applications. 169 Nonetheless, Milwaukee If might be inapplica-
ble in some cases. Moreover, federal common law should not be
replaced by statute if the argument can be made that: (1) the
subject matter of a particular case does not fall within a federal
statute; (2) the statute is not sufficiently comprehensive to rem-
edy the problem; (3) the act does not contain a citizen suit pro-
vision and, therefore, provides no adequate remedy; or (4) Con-
gress showed its intent through a broadly worded savings clause.
Although federal common-law nuisance is no longer viable
for all practical purposes, the Supreme Court has ruled that
state common-law nuisance claims may survive. In International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette17 0 the Court rejected the argument that
the Clean Water Act preempted a nuisance claim under state
common law for interstate water pollution. The Court did hold
that, as required by the legislative and regulatory scheme of the
Act, the claim must be governed by the law of the state in which
the pollution source is located, but, otherwise, state common law
remains intact.' 17 On remand, the district court found that the
state common-law nuisance claim was not preempted by the
Clean Air Act.172 State common-law nuisance claims are still via-
ble claims in federal court if pendent to a federal statutory
claim. For example, the courts in Stoddard v. Western Carolina
Regional Sewer Authority1 3 and Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Lamphier7 4 allowed pendent state law nuisance claims in
citizen suits for violations of the Clean Water Act and RCRA,
respectively.
The defendant in Stoddard argued that the South Carolina
regulatory scheme embodied in the Pollution Control Act and
adopted pursuant to the Clean Water Act preempted state com-
mon-law remedies for a nuisance that amounted to a taking of
169. See, e.g., Reeger v. Mill Serv., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Clean
Air Act); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (RCRA,
CERCLA).
170. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
171. Id. at 491-97.
172. See Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58 (D. Vt. 1987).
173. 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
174. 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
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property without compensation. 17 The Fourth Circuit held that
neither the Pollution Control Act nor the Clean Water Act sup-
plants common law and that, instead, the Pollution Control Act
expressly preserves remedies not provided by the statute it-
self.176 Common-law nuisance is still a viable cause of action in
both federal and state courts in South Carolina.1
77
Lamphier is another Fourth Circuit case in which the dis-
trict court found the defendants guilty of violating federal and
state antipollution statutes and of maintaining a common-law
nuisance. In this case, the defendants co-owned a farm in Vir-
ginia on which they dumped industrial wastes.7 " Two private
environmental groups filed a complaint against them under the
citizen-suit provision of RCRA. 179 The state intervened, ap-
pending state law claims to the action. The district court then
issued an injunction ordering the defendants to comply with
hazardous waste regulations and awarded fees and costs. A claim
seeking civil penalties was voluntarily dismissed at trial.
On appeal the defendants contended that Virginia's hazard-
ous waste statute preempted the state common law of nuisance.
They analogized their situation to National Sea Clammers, in
which the FWPCA was held to supersede the federal common
law of nuisance. 80 The court disagreed, saying that Virginia law
requires proof from the express or implied language of the stat-
ute of its intent to change the common law.' 8 ' Further, it held
that the defendants failed to provide that proof.
Stoddard and Lamphier highlight the advantage of bringing
both a citizen suit for violations of the pertinent federal statute
and a pendent state common-law nuisance claim. An injunction,
attorneys' fees, and civil penalties may result from winning the
175. See 784 F.2d at 1206.
176. See id. at 1207 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-240 (Law. Co-op. 1987)).
"[N]othing herein contained shall abridge or alter rights of action in the civil courts or
remedies existing in equity or under the common law or statutory law . . . ." Id. (em-
phasis deleted).
177. The New York court in State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 33, 479
N.Y.S,2d 1010 (1984), also had rejected the contention that common-law nuisance ac-
tions had been preempted by statutory procedures for pollution abatement. See id. at 38,
479 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
178. 714 F.2d at 333.
179. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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citizen suit; damages can also be awarded through the nuisance
claim.
The availability of DHEC's course of action to private citi-
zens for a private nuisance action, or to private citizens pursuing
a public nuisance action, is debatable. It is unlikely that private
citizens will be able to use the administrative forum or the pow-
ers of an administrative agency to redress private- grievances.
Furthermore, a private citizen may not have the government's
motivations for choosing the agency forum.
In contrast, if a citizen asserts a public nuisance claim, he
may be able to use the administrative arena to a greater extent
either by initiating an administrative proceeding in his own
right, if possible, or by prompting the agency to initiate proceed-
ings and attempting to intervene. The latter situation, in fact,
occurred in the Suffolk Chemical case. A number of citizens and
local governmental units in the Chapin area urged DHEC to be-
gin an enforcement action. When proceedings were initiated,
several of the governmental units were allowed to intervene. The
intervenors actively participated in the proceedings and played a
major role in the development of the case. At the same time,
several individuals did, in fact, file a lawsuit in the circuit court
for Lexington County requesting damages and closure of the
plant on their own. The lawsuit was settled at the same time as
the administrative proceeding.
Even if the private plaintiff has access to the administrative
forum, the agency can grant him only limited relief. Rarely will
an administrative body have authority to award damages to a
private party. The administrative proceeding may result in an
abatement order or assessment of a civil penalty, but to recover
damages, the citizen generally will have to pursue his remedy in
court.
Another significant limitation on the use of nuisance to ob-
tain closure of a plant such as Suffolk is the simple recognition
that a court is less likely to find permanent closure of an indus-
trial facility to be an appropriate remedy for a private nuisance
than for a public nuisance. A private citizen asserting even a
public nuisance claim is perhaps less likely to obtain closure as a
remedy than will the government.
One final limitation on the applicability of the Suffolk situa-
tion to other cases may be the difficulties of proving not only
that a public nuisance exists, but also that plant closure is the
19891 417
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only adequate remedy. Even if a nuisance is proved, counsel for
a defendant will, and should, offer every lesser alternative as a
means of abatement. By its nature, nuisance law requires that
each case be evaluated on its facts, both regarding the existence
of a nuisance in the first instance and then the imposition of an
appropriate remedy. Whenever lesser means of abatement ap-
pear reasonable and adequate, the drastic remedy of permanent
closure of an active business will be inappropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of nuisance law, a common-law, after-the-fact ap-
proach to control of environmental problems, presents an inter-
esting contrast to modern environmental regulation, a prospec-
tive method of controlling environmental problems. Of
particular interest are the ways in which the two approaches are
used together. Although violation of environmental regulations
may constitute a public nuisance, the inapplicability of environ-
mental regulations, or compliance with those that do apply, does
not eliminate potential liability for public nuisance. The choice
of nuisance as a cause of action by a plaintiff, in particular a
government agency, may alert defense counsel to a government's
perceived weakness in its own statutory regulatory powers.
Nuisance law continues to remain useful to plaintiffs and
irritating to defendants because it is a "moving target," not sus-
ceptible of precise definition. Perhaps this moving target is an
appropriate counter to the "vanishing threat" of the Suffolk syn-
drome, the recurring environmental incident that threatens im-
mediate harm but leaves no residual damage in its wake.
The Suffolk case was settled, and the legal issues it raised
remain unresolved. Its practical impact may be significant, how-
ever, simply in terms of its result. Without resolution of the le-
gal issues concerning its authority, the State succeeded in ob-
taining permanent closure of the plant, wielding public nuisance
law as its primary weapon. Public nuisance law survives even in
the midst of what appears to be comprehensive environmental
regulation because of its ability to adapt to its surroundings
when environmental regulations cannot. The plaintiff who over-
looks nuisance as a potential cause of action may forego his
strongest weapon; the defendant who overlooks nuisance as a
potential liability may be unaware of his greatest danger.
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